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THE TIME-EXPIRED CIVIL RICO CLAIM AND
SUBSEQUENT PREDICATE ACTS
RICHARD P. SALGADO*
The expansive language and alluring remedies of the Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),' have made RICO a
seductive statute under which to sue. RICO is not, as its name would
imply, limited to traditional concepts of racketeering and organized
crime. 2 Through the liberal interpretation courts have given RICO,3 it
has made a foray into otherwise common disputes. 4 Although courts
have cultivated a generous body of law interpreting RICO, 5 fundamen-
tal issues remain unresolved regarding the point at which a civil RICO
claim accrues for the purpose of the statute of limitations and the reper-
cussions of continued racketeering activity.
In Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates,6 the United States
Supreme Court held that a civil RICO claim must be brought within four
years after the cause of action accrues. The Court expressly declined,
however, to determine when a RICO claim accrues so as to begin the
running of the four-year limitation period. 7 Consequently, many ques-
tions remain. This Article focuses on one such question: once the four-
year statute of limitations on an accrued RICO claim has run, of what
significance is a subsequent "predicate act" 8 in the same pattern of rack-
eteering activity?
* Judicial Clerk for the Honorable Lewis T. Babcock, United States District Court
Judge for the District of Colorado (1989-91); Yale Law School, J.D. (1989); University of
New Mexico, B.A. (1986).
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
2. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241-42 (1987);
Melly, Stretching Civil RICO: Pro-life demonstrators are racketeers, 56 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 287
(1988); Comment, All the Myriad Ways: Accrual of Civil RICO Claims in the Wake of Agency
Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff, 48 LA. L. REv. 1411, 1413 n.13 (1988).
3. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985).
4. See Note, RICO and a Uniform Rule of Accrual, 99 YALE L.J. 1399, 1399 n.5 (1990).
5. For a quantitative review of the use of RICO, see Task Force Report on Civil RICO,
A.B.A. SEC. CORP. BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK
FORCE (1984).
6. 483 U.S. 143, 156 (1987).
7. Id. at 156-57; Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1273 n.12 (10th
Cir. 1989).
8. In this Article, I use the term "predicate act," to refer to an instance of conduct
which, when coupled with a second "predicate act," constitutes a RICO "pattern of racke-
teering activity." Under RICO, a pattern comprises two predicate acts committed no more
than ten years apart. 28 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). Although injury is not a necessary in-
gredient under all definitions of predicate act, in this Article, unless otherwise expressed, I
assume that for each predicate act there is an accompanying and contemporaneous injury,
and that the predicate acts are related and amount to or pose a threat of continued racke-
teering activity. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239
(1989); Phelps, 886 F.2d at 1273. See also Enzo Biochem, Inc. v.Johnson &Johnson, No. 87
CIV 6125 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 1990) (LEXIS Genfed library, Dist file) (addressing
causation).
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There are many possible answers to that query. At one extreme, for
example, a predicate act committed after the statute of limitations has
run on prior predicate acts may save an otherwise barred claim and al-
low a plaintiff to recover for injuries sustained as a result of all previous
predicate acts. At the other extreme, a plaintiff may lose all hope of
recovering for the injuries incurred as a result of the previous predicate
acts. The Tenth Circuit had an opportunity to address this question in
Bath v. Bushkin, Gainu, Gaines &Jonas.9 The Tenth Circuit, however, gave
only a glimpse of what may be.
This Article looks at the possible rules and concludes that the best
approach lies between the extremes of resurrecting the entire cause of
action (including expired predicate acts), and banishing the claim alto-
gether. I begin with a brief analysis of the competing RICO claim ac-
crual rules and the Tenth Circuit's selection among them. Although
more may be said on the virtues and evils inherent in each of the differ-
ing approaches to accrual.' 0 I focus on the rule selected by the Tenth
Circuit, and the unaddressed issue of the subsequent predicate act and
its impact on the time-barred RICO claim.
I. THE COMPETING APPROACHES TO RICO CLAIM ACCRUAL
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Malley-Duff, many federal cir-
cuit courts have crafted methods to determine when a RICO claim ac-
crues,' I including the Tenth Circuit in Bath. Typically, a cause of action
accrues when a plaintiff knows or should know of the existence of the
elements of the claim.' 2 The elements of a RICO claim' 3 are: (1) con-
duct, (2) of an enterprise, (3) through a pattern of racketeering activity,
(4) which injures plaintiff's business or property.14 The awkward nature
9. 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990) (reversed in part on other grounds in Lampf, Pleva,
Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991), as stated in Anixter v.
Home-stake Prod. Co., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,128 (10th Cir. July 22, 1991)).
Before Bath, one district court within the Tenth Circuit confronted the RICO accrual ques-
tion. Indianapolis Hotel Investors, Ltd. v. Aircoa Equity Interests, Inc., 733 F. Supp.
1406, 1408-10 (D. Colo. 1990) (civil RICO claim accrues when plaintiff knows or should
know of existence of all elements including pattern).
10. For a more complete comparison of the rules and their variations, see Note, supra
note 4, at 1409-17; Comment, supra note 2, at 1413-21; Note, "Mother of Mercy, is this the
Beginning of RICO: The Proper Point of a Private Civil RICO Action, 65 N.Y.U.L. REV. 172
(1990).
11. The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have
grappled with the issue. Rodriguez v. Banco Central, 917 F.2d 664, 665-68 (1st Cir.
1990); Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1102-05 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1007 (1989); Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1988);
Pocahontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211, 220 (4th Cir.
1987); La Porte Constr. Co. v. Bayshore Nat'l Bank, 805 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986);
Granite Falls Bank v. Henrikson, 924 F.2d 150, 152-55 (8th Cir. 1991); Compton v. Ide,
732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984); Bowling v. Founders Title Co., 773 F.2d 1175, 1178
(1 1th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109 (1986).
12. Indianapolis Hotel, 733 F. Supp. at 1409. The plaintiff need not comprehend the
legal implications, however. See Keystone, 863 F.2d at 1128.
13. These are the elements of the vast majority of RICO actions. See Note, supra note
4 at 1400 & n.8.
14. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985); Bivens Gardens Office
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of a RICO claim, specifically the requirements of pattern and injury, is
the source of difficulty that courts have had with delineating the point of
accrual. 15
Courts have developed essentially three distinct accrual rules. 16
The first and most common approach among the circuits is the "discov-
ery" rule.17 This rule provides that a civil RICO claim accrues when a
plaintiff knows or should know of the injury resulting from the defend-
ant's conduct. This is the default approach used in federal actions
where Congress has not designated an alternative rule.' 8
The second approach is termed the "last injury" rule. 19 This rule
provides that each time a plaintiff suffers an injury caused by a predicate
act, a new cause of action accrues as to that injury when the plaintiff
knows or should have known of that injury. The analysis behind this
rule is enticing because it flows from the Clayton Act,20 which is the
source for the four-year statute of limitations.2 ' The heart of the last
injury rule, like the discovery rule, is in the discovery of injury.
The third approach is called the "last predicate act" rule. 22 Under
this rule, a RICO claim accrues upon the commission of the latest predi-
Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546, 1553 n.10 (11 th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 1695 (1991); Phelps v. Witchita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir. 1989).
15. See Note, supra note 4, at 1400 ("[oln the face of [RICO], it is unclear whether
plaintiff's cause of action accrues upon injury resulting from one act of such pattern or
whether the claim accrues after plaintiff can allege a pattern of racketeering activity.").
16. Some commentators purport to have identified more than three. See, e.g., Note,
supra note 4, at 1409 (defining 5 approaches); Comment, supra note 2, at 1413 (4 ap-
proaches). Except for the so-called "Clayton Act" rule, all the approaches identified are
variations of the discovery, last injury and last predicate act rules. The Clayton Act rule
has found a home in only a few courts, see, e.g., Gilbert Family Partnership v. Nido Corp.,
679 F. Supp. 679, 686 (E.D. Mich. 1988); Armbrister v. Roland Int'l Corp., 667 F. Supp.
802 ( M.D. Fla. 1987), and has been criticized. Note, supra note 4, at 1416-17; Comment,
supra note 2, at 1427. Furthermore, the Clayton Act rule, in practice, may function the
same as the discovery rule. See Rodriguez v. Banco Central, 917 F.2d 664, 666 (lst Cir.
1990); Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1134 (3d Cir. 1988); cf. Comment,
supra note 2, at 1421. For a more detailed review of the Clayton Act rule, see Bivens Gar-
dens, 906 F.2d at 1551 & n.9 (and cases cited therein).
17. See, e.g., Riddell v. Riddell Wash. Corp., 866 F.2d 1480, 1489-90 (D.C. Cir. 1989);
Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Madariaga, 851 F.2d 271,274-76 (9th Cir. 1988); Poca-
hontas Supreme Coal Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 828 F.2d 211,220 (4th Cir. 1987); La
Porte Constr. Co. v. Bayshore Nat'l Bank, 805 F.2d 1254, 1256 (5th Cir. 1986); Bowling v.
Founders Title Co., 773 F.2d 1175, 1178 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1109
(1986); Alexander v. Perkin Elmer Corp., 729 F.2d 576, 577-78 (8th Cir. 1984); Compton
v. Ide, 732 F.2d 1429, 1433 (9th Cir. 1984). See also Zablocki v. Huber, 743 F. Supp. 626,
628 (E.D. Wis. 1990); Coal-Mac, Inc. v. JRM Coal, Co., 743 F. Supp. 499, 500 (E.D. Ky.
1990).
18. See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-23 (1979).
19. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1102-05 (2d Cir. 1988).
20. 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (current version at -).
21. In adopting the statute of limitations period applicable to Clayton Act actions, the
Supreme Court in Malley-Duff concluded that the Clayton Act "offers a far closer analogy
to RICO than any state law alternative." Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,
483 U.S. 143, 150 (1987). See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 111
S. Ct. 2773 (1991) (adopting uniform federal statutory limitations period for actions under
section 10(b) of the Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and Se-
curity Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990)).
22. See, e.g., Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, 863 F.2d 1125, 1130-35 (3d Cir. 1988).
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cate act in the pattern of racketeering. The statute of limitations begins
to run from the date plaintiff knew or should have known of the facts
that comprise the elements of a civil RICO cause of action. The clock is
reset, however, if a later predicate act is committed within ten years of a
previous predicate act and the later predicate act is part of the same
racketeering pattern. 23
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT
In Bath, the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's use of the dis-
covery rule, concluding that the discovery rule and the last injury rules
were incomplete. Because both rules emphasize knowledge of injury to
the exclusion of pattern, 24 the court adopted the Eleventh Circuit rule
"that with respect to each independent injury to the plaintiff, a civil
RICO cause of action begins to accrue as soon as the plaintiff discovers,
or reasonably should have discovered, both the existence and source of
his injury and that the injury is part of a pattern."
'25
Although Bath makes it clear that the plaintiff must have known or
should have known of the injury as well as the pattern before the statute
of limitations will begin to run on a RICO claim, Bath fails to articulate
how or when a RICO claim expires when there are three or more predi-
cate acts. The ambiguity of Bath is best illustrated by Figures 1 and 2 of
the appendix.
Figure 1 provides a time-line scenario of four RICO predicate acts
and injuries (PA I through PA IV). Figure 2 provides a matrix summa-
rizing the different results of each rule discussed in this Article. The
conclusions drawn in Figure 2 from the time-line scenario in Figure 1
rely on the following postulates:
(1) at the time of each predicate act and accompanying injury,
the plaintiff knew or should have known of the predicate act
and accompanying injury;
(2) at the time of each predicate act and accompanying injury,
the plaintiff had not brought a RICO action on any previous
predicate act and accompanying injury.
Referring to Figure 1, Bath makes it clear that if, in Year 1, the
plaintiff knows of Predicate Act I, he still has no RICO claim. This is
because there is no pattern, only a single predicate act. If, in Year 9,
however, the plaintiff learns or should have learned of Predicate Act II,
he has a RICO claim in Year 9 and must bring an action in four years. If,
by Year 14, the plaintiff still has not brought the RICO claim based on
Predicate Acts I & II, then that claim is barred.
The ambiguity in Bath arises if, in Year 15, the plaintiff discovers or
23. See Note, supra note 4, at 1413-14.
24. Bath v. Bushkin, 913 F.2d 817, 820-21 (10th Cir. 1989).
25. Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546, 1554-55 (11 th
Cir. 1990). The last predicate act rule was first adopted within the Tenth Circuit in Indian-
apolis Hotel Investors, Ltd. v. Aircoa Equity Interests, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 1406, 1408-10
(D. Colo. 1990).
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should have discovered Predicate Act III. It may be that the plaintiff has
a RICO claim based on all three predicate acts. Alternatively, he may be
able to premise the claim on only the second and third predicate acts.
Perhaps the plaintiff would have a cause of action, but would be able to
recover for the injuries resulting from only certain predicate acts. It may
also be that there would be no RICO cause of action for any of the inju-
ries or predicate acts. The number of possible outcomes is limited only
by the number of predicate acts and resulting injuries.
26
Bath provides district courts and the bar little guidance as to which
of the myriad of possible outcomes is proper. The decision does not
address this important yet subtle RICO claim accrual issue except in a
footnote. 2 7 There, the panel in Bath quotes from the Third Circuit's
opinion in Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton.28 In Keystone the Third Circuit
held:
The rule which we announce provides that the limitations
period for a civil RICO claim runs from the date the plaintiff
knew or should have known that the elements of the civil RICO
cause of action existed unless, as a part of the same pattern of
racketeering activity, there is further injury to the plaintiff or
further predicate acts occur, in which case the accrual period
shall run from the time when the plaintiff knew or should have
known of the last injury or the last predicate act which is part of
the same pattern of racketeering activity. The last predicate act
need not have resulted in injury to the plaintiff but must be part
of the same pattern. If the complaint was filed within four years
of the last injury or the last predicate act, the plaintiff may re-
cover for injuries caused by other predicate acts which oc-
curred outside an earlier limitations period but which are part
of the same "pattern."
2 9
It is premature to assume, however, that the Tenth Circuit has con-
cluded more than that trial courts within the Circuit are to apply the last
predicate act rule. First, the issue of whether a third predicate act may
give rise to a RICO claim otherwise barred by the four-year limitations
period was not before the court. Second, except for the footnote, the
court never discussed the issue. Finally, the court quoted Keystone only
as a summarization of the holding in Bivens Garden, which the Tenth Cir-
cuit adopted. Consequently, based solely on Bath, it is impossible to
draw any conclusion beyond the Tenth Circuit's rejection of the discov-
ery and last injury rules.
To the extent, however, that Bath does adopt the Keystone approach,
the Tenth Circuit should repudiate that decision. By allowing a subse-
quent predicate act to resurrect recovery for otherwise time-barred
predicate acts, Keystone protracts the four-year limitations period of Mal-
26. For each predicate act, the court is presented with the choice of either allowing or
barring recovery for the accompanying injury. In addition, for each predicate act, the
court must decide whether that act is within the pattern of racketeering.
27. Bath, 913 F.2d at 820 n.2.
28. 863 F.2d 1125 (3d Cir. 1988).
29. Id. at 1130-31.
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ley-Duff, stretches further the already strained reach of RICO, and dis-
torts the point of accrual, rather than promoting certainty. The better
approach is to preclude recovery for the injuries arising from the predi-
cate acts for which the plaintiff failed to sue timely, but allow recovery
for the injuries incurred as a result of any subsequent predicate acts.
111. RESOLTION
The Tenth Circuit's conclusion that a RICO claim will not accrue
unless the plaintiff knew or should have known not only of his injury, but
also of a pattern of predicate acts, is well reasoned.3 0 The conclusion
left the accrual puzzle incomplete, however, by failing to determine how
a time-barred RICO claim interacts with a subsequent predicate act in
the same pattern of racketeering.
I undertake that task by first looking to the possible rules governing
the impact of the hypothetical Predicate Acts III & IV. I then conclude
that a predicate act should not resurrect a time-barred RICO claim and
allow a slothful plaintiff to recover for the injuries arising from the pred-
icate acts that form the otherwise expired RICO claim. The harshness
of this result is tempered because a plaintiff may recover under RICO
for the injury sustained as a result of the last predicate act.
A. Managing Predicate Acts Committed after the Statute of Limitations has
Run
Although the number of methods to manage predicate acts commit-
ted subsequent to the expiration of the statute of limitations depends on
the number of predicate acts involved, 3 l there are four fundamental ap-
proaches. Under the Third Circuit's analysis in Keystone, the plaintiff
would be able to bring a RICO claim even after the limitations period
has run as to Predicate Acts I & II, so long as he sued no more than four
years after he learned or should have learned of Predicate Act III. Fur-
thermore, the plaintiff may recover for his injuries sustained from Predi-
cate Acts I & II, and need not have suffered injury from Predicate Act
III. Likewise, he could sue on Predicate Act IV and recover for all predi-
cate acts even though the statutory period ran on a suit relying solely on
Predicate Acts I, II & III, so long as he sued within four years of Predi-
cate Act IV. I refer to this as "Keystone Resurrection."
A second technique is to divest the predicate acts upon which the
plaintiff could have sued, but did not, of any legal significance. The the-
ory is that, because the plaintiff failed to sue on Predicate Acts I & II,
they no longer function as predicate acts in the pattern. Thus, the pass-
ing of the time limitations for the RICO action based on Predicate Acts I
& II not only precludes the plaintiff from recovering under RICO for
those acts, but those acts actually lose their status as predicate acts. The
30. See Note, supra note 4, at 1418 (concluding RICO statute of limitations should run
"from the discovery of the last predicate act of the defendant .....
31. See supra note 26.
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consequence of this approach can be severe. If there is no Predicate Act
IV, the plaintiff will have no RICO claim at all. This is because the time-
barred predicate acts have lost their status as part of a RICO pattern
and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot avail himself of the previous predi-
cate acts to establish a pattern.3 2 Under this theory, Predicate Act III is
essentially the first predicate act in a new pattern of racketeering activity
and a new RICO claim will accrue only if there is a Predicate Act IV. I
refer to this as "Complete Expiration."
A third rule is that the plaintiff may recover for Predicate Act III and
any predicate acts committed ten or fewer years before Predicate Act III,
if suit is brought within four years of Predicate Act III. This approach
turns on the fact that Congress has chosen to define "pattern" as two
predicate acts committed within ten years of each other. Congress has
thus concluded that an act committed more than ten years before other
predicate acts is too stale to be considered part of a pattern. Likewise, it
may be that a predicate act committed more than ten years before the
most recent predicate act is too stale for the purposes of recovery. If this
approach were adopted, the plaintiff could recover not only for the in-
jury incurred as a result of Predicate Act III, but also for the injury aris-
ing from Predicate Act II, which would only be five years old at the time
of Predicate Act III. He could not, however, recover for the injury in-
curred as a result of Predicate Act I, which would be thirteen years old at
the time of Predicate Act III. Likewise, if suit were brought within four
years of Predicate Act IV, the plaintiff could recover for Predicate Acts II
& III in addition to Predicate Act IV. I refer to this as the "Ten-Year
Radius."
This rule functions exactly the same as the Keystone Resurrection
rule if one accepts the contention that Congress created a statute of re-
pose by defining "pattern" as two predicate acts committed within ten
years of each other. It may be, as one commentator implies,3 3 that a
plaintiff may never recover for any predicate act and its attendant injury
if ten years have passed since it was or should have been discovered.
This problem could arise in certain cases. Figure 1 provides an example
where:
(1) Predicate Acts I & II are less than ten years apart;
(2) Predicate Acts II & III are less than ten years apart; and
(3) Predicate Acts III & IV are less than ten years apart.
If a pattern comprises only acts committed no more than ten years from
the most recent predicate act, then:
(1) At the time of Predicate Act III, Predicate Act I has no
legal significance for the purposes of RICO (only Predi-
cate Acts II & III comprise a pattern); and
(2) At the time of Predicate Act IV, Predicate Act I has no
32. Plaintiff may, of course, have legal theories other than RICO on which to recover
for the predicate acts.
33. Comment, supra note 2, at 1423.
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legal significance for the purpose of RICO (only Predicate
Acts II, III & IV comprise the pattern).
Predicate Act I is omitted from the pattern because it was committed
more than ten years before Predicate Acts III & IV.
This interpretation of the definition of pattern imposes what is es-
sentially a ten-year statute of repose on each predicate act; after ten
years, a predicate act of which plaintiff knows or should know loses all
RICO significance. This interpretation also converts the Keystone Resur-
rection rule into the Ten-Year Radius rule because, after ten years, a
predicate act is not related to the pattern. To fully develop the different
possible rules to deal with subsequent predicate acts here, it is assumed
that there is no ten-year statute of repose. This assumption is not with-
out basis.
First, the language of RICO does not require the imposition of a
ten-year statute of repose. The definition of "pattern of racketeering
activity" is two specified acts "the last of which occurred within ten years
... after the commission of a prior act."' 34 This definition, however, in
no way ordains that a "pattern" could not comprise three predicate acts,
the last of which is more than ten years apart from the first, so long as
the second predicate act is no more than ten years from both the first
and third predicate acts. 35 Second, even assuming that one could strain
to construe RICO to impose a statute of repose, such an interpretation
would be inconsistent with the liberal reading mandated by "Congress'
self-consciously expansive language and overall approach .... ,36
A fourth rule is that Predicate Act III will not allow the plaintiff to
recover for the injuries incurred as a result of Predicate Acts I & II.
Predicate Acts I & II will, however, serve as predicate acts for the pur-
pose of establishing that Predicate Act III was part of a pattern. As one
district court has concluded:
The rule I adopt closely follows that of Keystone Ins. Co., except
that once the claim accrues, a plaintiff must bring an action in
four years. A subsequent violation, beyond the four year time
period, will not resurrect a RICO cause of action for the previ-
ous violations even if in the same pattern of racketeering activ-
ity and even if a plaintiff is thereby injured. The rule is liberal
in that a defendant must show that a plaintiff knew or should
have known of the existence of each element of the RICO
claim, not simply injury. On the other hand, the rule is consis-
tent with the underlying purpose of a statute of limitation be-
cause it promotes certainty and does not encourage a plaintiff
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988).
35. See Rodriguez v. Banco Central, 917 F.2d 664, 666-67 (1st Cir. 1990) (hypothesiz-
ing that series of predicate acts two years apart may create pattern for "thirty or forty
years" under last predicate act accrual rule).
36. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1985). See Pub. L. No. 91-
452 § 904(a), 84 Stat. 942,947 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982)) (congressional
instruction to judiciary that RICO "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial
purposes."); Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Bank, 906 F.2d 1546, 1555 n.l I
(llth Cir. 1990).
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to sleep on an accrued right to bring an action. Consequently,
under the rule adopted here, a subsequent predicate act after
expiration of the statute of limitations will not save a slothful
claimant by reviving the claim.
3 7
Under this formulation, the plaintiff, injured as a result of Predicate
Act III, may recover under RICO for that injury if he brings suit within
four years of Predicate Act III. He would not, however, recover for the
injuries incurred as a result of Predicate Acts I & 11.38 Furthermore, if
he failed to bring an action on Predicate Act III within four years of that
act, he would not recover under RICO for the injury incurred as a result
of Predicate Act III, even if there is a subsequent Predicate Act IV. The
plaintiff would, of course, be able to recover for the injury sustained as a
result of Predicate Act IV if he brought suit within four years of that act,
although he would not recover for any of the prior acts. Thus, a predi-
cate act on which the limitations period has run retains its utility as an
act to define a pattern, but has no value in calculating damages or estab-
lishing injury. I refer to this as "Injury Expiration."
B. Recommendation
Of the four approaches, the Injury Expiration rule functions con-
sistently with the goals of RICO and the principles of time limitation.
The four-year limitations period set forth in Malley-Duff is left hollow
under the Keystone Resurrection rule. As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate,
under Keystone Resurrection, if a slothful plaintiff knowingly allows the
RICO claim based on Predicate Acts I & II to expire, he is still granted a
fresh four-year period in which to sue by Predicate Act III, and again by
Predicate Act IV. Consequently, he could recover for Predicate Acts I &
II even though the statute of limitations ran twice. 39
Arguably, the expansive language of RICO should save the claim of
a delinquent plaintiff. After all, if a defendant maintains a course of
racketeering activity, justice may demand payment for the totality of ille-
gal conduct. Keystone Resurrection, however, conflicts directly with the
objective of Malley-Duff to provide a certain and uniform expiration pe-
riod. By reviving a claim otherwise barred, Keystone Resurrection in-
troduces further disarray and speculation.
Complete Expiration, on the other hand, is inconsistent with the
remedial purposes of RICO. Its main flaw is that it deprives predicate
acts of their function as elements of a pattern. A plaintiff may not wish
to bring suit on Predicate Acts I & II, but, upon discovery of Predicate
Act III, decide that suit is appropriate. Complete Expiration would de-
prive him of that option unless a fourth predicate act was committed.
37. Indianapolis Hotel Investors, Ltd. v. Aircoa Equity Interests, Inc., 733 F. Supp.
1406, 1409 (D. Colo. 1990).
38. See Comment, supra note 2, at 1415-16.
39. It first ran four years after Predicate Act II and again four years after Predicate Act
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There is no corresponding benefit to public policy or to the purposes of
RICO in refusing the plaintiff this choice.
Indeed, Complete Expiration is a catalyst for law suits. A plaintiff
would be well advised to bring an action on Predicate Acts I & II, rather
than choose an alternate course, for fear that if the racketeering conduct
continues, he would be barred from a later RICO suit until he suffers
through two additional predicate acts committed within ten years of
each other. In addition, after the limitations period runs on Predicate
Acts I & II, under Complete Expiration, a defendant would be free to
commit Predicate Act III without fear of RICO liability.40 Indeed, the
defendant could commit a new predicate act each time the four-year lim-
itations period ran on prior predicate acts.
The Ten-Year Radius rule is infected by the same malady as that of
Keystone Resurrection, but suffers to a lesser degree. As Figures 1 and 2
illustrate, under the Ten-Year Radius rule, a slothful plaintiff may know-
ingly allow the RICO claim based on Predicate Acts I & II to expire, yet
is granted a fresh four-year period in which to sue and recover on Predi-
cate Act II by Predicate Act III, and again by Predicate Act IV. Conse-
quently, he could recover for Predicate Act II even though the statute of
limitations ran twice.41 This renders the four-year limitations period as
speculative as does Keystone Resurrection and thwarts the aims of Malley-
Duff.
4 2
The Injury Expiration rule strikes a balance between the purposes
of RICO and the goals of the statute of limitations. Under this rule, a
plaintiff has four years to bring suit on Predicate Acts I & II, or lose the
right to recover for the injuries incurred from those predicate acts.
Consequently, the rule does not suffer, as does Keystone Resurrection
and the Ten-Year Radius rule, from the defect that the limitations pe-
riod is uncertain. Plaintiffs must sue within four years of when they dis-
covered or should have discovered the pattern or forever lose the right
to recover for the injuries accompanying the predicate acts comprising
the pattern. A subsequent predicate act will not nullify the legal force of
an expired limitations period by bestowing a new four-year period to
recover for otherwise time-barred predicate acts.
Unlike the Complete Expiration rule, however, the predicate acts
upon which a plaintiff could have sued do not lose their status as predi-
cate acts for future suits. Rather, those predicate acts expire only to the
extent that a plaintiff may not recover for the accompanying injuries.
Thus, a plaintiff who chooses not to sue and recover on Predicate Acts I
& II cannot change his mind and sue in Year 14. He may, however, use
Predicate Acts I & II to show a pattern and recover for Predicate Act III
if suit is brought within four years of that act. He may also use Predicate
40. Like the dog of classic tort law, the defendant would be entitled to one free bite
for each time the four-year limitations period ran on prior predicate acts. See LAZAR,
ANIMAL CONTROL LAW: CIVIL LIABILITY FOR THE MISDEEDS OF ANIMALS 2-3 (Supp. 1988).
41. It first ran four years after Predicate Act II and again four years after Predicate Act
III.
42. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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Acts I, II & III to show a pattern and recover for Predicate Act IV if suit
is brought within four years of that act. The plaintiff need not fear that,
by declining to sue on a pattern of predicate acts, he has surrendered a
later RICO claim on a subsequent predicate act in the same pattern. If
the plaintiff elects to delay bringing suit, however, he does so knowing
that he loses his ability to recover for injuries sustained from the predi-
cate acts on which he did not sue timely.
Furthermore, if the plaintiff chooses to -bring: an action based on
Predicate Acts I & II, the predicate acts do not lose their stature as acts
within a pattern if he later attempts to recover for Predicate Act III. He
will not, of course, recover for the injuries sustained as a result of Predi-
cate Acts I & II, and may recover only for the injury incurred as a result
of Predicate Act III. 4 3 The plaintiff may still use Predicate Acts I & II to
define the pattern of racketeering. Likewise, if after recovering for Pred-
icate Acts I, II & III, he sued on Predicate Act IV, the plaintiff will re-
cover only for the Predicate Act IV injury.
The Injury Expiration rule may create an incentive to pursue what
appears at first blush to be a peculiar defense strategy. In some circum-
stances, Injury Expiration may prompt a defendant to argue that he
committed more acts of racketeering than the plaintiff alleged. This cu-
rious tactic can be completely rational and is easily explicable on eco-
nomic grounds.
For example, if the defendant was faced with allegations that he vio-
lated RICO through a pattern of racketeering comprising Predicate Acts
II & III, on a summary judgment motion 4 4 he may wish to affirmatively
and unilaterally prove that Predicate Act I was also part of the pattern.
The defendant may opt to establish the existence of Predicate Act I even
if the plaintiff does not seek recovery for Predicate Act I and never al-
leged the act in the complaint. By doing so, the defendant would show
that a RICO claim accrued from Predicate Acts I & II and that the limita-
tions period has run on those acts by the time of Predicate Act III. The
defendant would thus reveal that RICO recovery is unavailable on Predi-
cate Act 11.
4 5
43. This is because the plaintiff would enjoy duplicative recovery. He would have
recovered for the injuries sustained from Predicate Acts I & II both on the initial suit and
again when he sued on Predicate Act III.
44. Because of the predictably negative effects such an argument would have on the
jury's opinion of the defendant, it is doubtful the defendant would wish to raise this at trial
in front of the jury.
45. The prudence of this strategy depends on the ancillary effects of admitting to pre-
vious misconduct and requires risk analysis. Assuming the plaintiff did not know of Predi-
cate Act I because of lack of reasonable diligence, upon learning of Predicate Act I he may
be able to pursue other legal theories to recover for that act. Accordingly, before affirma-
tively admitting to Predicate Act I, the litigation-rational defendant should compare the
chance of his being found liable on a non-RICO theory for Predicate Act I (multiplied by
the damages inflicted on the plaintiff by Predicate Act I), with the risk that he will face
RICO liability on Predicate Act II (multiplied by the damages inflicted on the plaintiff by
Predicate Act II and trebled). Cf C. Andrew & R. Tavi, Dancing into the Tempting Ocean:
Costs of Confessional Offerings 7 (final ed. Feb. 23, 1991) (unpublished manuscript).
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CONCLUSION
The Injury Expiration rule provides for both a meaningful statutory
limitations period and continued liberal RICO recovery. It supplies
much needed certainty, 4 6 without judicial rewriting or strained interpre-
tation of RICO. At the same time, the rule avoids creating incentives to
bring suit rather than seek alternative redress and does not allow de-
fendants to freely commit additional predicate acts each time the four-
year period expires on previous predicate acts. In the absence of clarifi-
cation by Congress, the Injury Expiration rule is the best technique to
manage predicate acts committed after the statute of limitations has run.
46. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 154 (1987).
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